In contrast to our visit to Beijing a year ago, most of our contacts didn’t seem to have a care in the world. Twelve months ago, the talk was all about tariffs, local government finance strains, the prospect of negative growth surprises and even war with Taiwan.
This year the Taiwan outlook is “peaceful”, the 15th Five-Year Plan is broadly viewed as wellfocused and positive for growth, real estate and other macro signals are ‘improving’ and the Iran War is rarely mentioned except to say that China has advantages compared to other countries. Oil resilience, property stabilisation, achievable growth targets, steady macro policies and a general air of confidence were the key takeaways.
We can summarise our visit under the following five headings (we will produce a more extensive China analysis after our visits to Indonesia and Malaysia this week). Bear in mind, these are the consensus comments of our contacts in Beijing.
1) “Better placed than others”
That was the main conclusion from our meetings when we raised the subject of the Iran War and oil supply disruption. Oil stocks are claimed to be around 111 days based on 2025 purchases and may possibly be higher if China has increased purchases in anticipation of the war. Measures are already in the works to lower retail energy prices as China has the fiscal space to do so.
That aside, a more diversified electricity generation profile and higher penetration of electric vehicles will help to soften the price and supply blows if, as we expect, they intensify over coming months. In the meantime, Beijing is offering to assist neighbours – Korea, the Philippines and Vietnam among them – if they face difficulties with oil product supplies.
2) Taiwan: No problem
Last year, for the first time in 30 years visiting the Mainland, our contacts brought up, unprompted, the possibility of war breaking out between Taiwan and China. Perhaps this was more to do with the Trump Administration attitude to tariffs, containing China and supplying Taiwan with arms. This year, the commentary couldn’t be more different. ‘Peaceful coexistence’ between the Mainland and its ‘errant’ province was seen as the norm.
Cheng Li-wun, the new leader of the Kuomintang, is scheduled to visit Beijing next week to meet with President Xi Jinping. Opinion polls put her well ahead of the pro-independence DPP’s Lai Ching-te, the current president. Beijing will probably be happy to sit out Lai’s remaining term – especially as he has no majority in the Legislative Yuan – in anticipation of friendlier relations being resumed in 2028. Moreover, China’s internal political timeline supports a “wait and see” approach. The US’s current struggles in the Middle East and the purge of PLA generals makes any Taiwan-China face-off a non-starter in 2026. In 2027, Xi Jinping’s attention will be domestically focused as his third term as president reaches a conclusion. In short, the timing is all wrong for a cross-Strait conflict in the next few years.
3) 15th Five Year Plan: Modest growth, big plans
The first year of five-year plans is a scene setter for the future. The pronouncements delivered in March have gone down well with a wide variety of commentators. The modest growth target of 4.5-5% for 2026 is viewed as easily achievable by most of our contacts. The focus on high quality, high technology advancement – including integrated circuits, biotechnology, battery storage, the low-altitude economy, drones, driverless cars, renewable energy and artificial intelligence deployment – are all viewed as convincing strategies for future growth.
In the policy priority list, these sectors and the growth approach feature high up the list. Taking care of local government financing problems has dropped to the bottom – signalling that the job is all but done in the mind of central government. One contact remarked that the tone coming out of the NPC meetings was one of confidence, a distinction and departure from the 2025 Congress. The confidence is further underlined by signs of an upturn in consumer prices, private sector fixed asset investment and the real estate market.
4) Property: Signs of stabilisation
No one is looking for the property sector to pick up and become a growth driver but there was an air of confidence that the worst was over (except for one contact who expected a further 20% decline in house prices). In the first two months of the year, second-hand home sales in Shanghai hit levels not seen since 2021. While this will have been driven partly by local restrictions being lifted, the improvement in activity has been taken positively.
It is also the case that delivery of pre-sold but unfinished properties has almost been completed, a view that was also expressed during our visit to Hong Kong in February. Overall, the outlook for the sector was described as ‘stabilisation’ rather than recovery. One contact cited the drop in home sales values from Rmb18trn pre-Covid to the Rmb8trn reported last year as a signal that the market had bottomed out. However, even if this proves to be optimistic, the shrinking size of the property sector means that any further contraction in activity becomes much less of a drag on economic growth.
5) Exports: Still rocking
Perhaps the most contentious outlook – from our perspective – was the view that exports will continue to contribute strongly to economic growth. The two scheduled meetings for this year between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump were seen as delivering normalisation between the two superpowers. With that, Chinese exports to the US, which fell 20% in 2025, were expected to level out if not increase.
In dealings with the rest of the world, China’s competitiveness and ability to deliver products that are in demand across the globe – especially in the technology and AI spaces – were seen as significant strengths. As we have pointed out in previous reports, China’s real effective exchange rate depreciation, resulting from its low inflation trajectory, has been a pillar of strength in maintaining its competitive edge. Whether that will be enough in a global economy likely to suffer severe growth downside in the next few months (at least) is another question.
As one contact put it to us, China’s current policy settings, including its relations with other countries, represents stability compared to the chaos of the Western alliance. It is hard to argue with that assessment. As he then said, “China is just observing”. We have no doubt that is true, it might also be laughing at the leadership clown show on both sides of the Atlantic.
But China also has some domestic issues to address. Consumer confidence remains depressed (if stable) and profit margins will be threatened by cost increases this year. Involution (or what we would call ‘competition’) is still cited as the main risk to the latest fiveyear plan strategy although improvements in local government finance (through central government transfers, which have been substantial, Rmb1.3trn according to one source, in the past year) are critical in changing the subsidy and incentives focus.
Given the daily drumbeat of bad news in other countries as the Iran War intensifies, our visit to Beijing was soothing, to say the least. We should all hope that the outlook there doesn’t prove to be too optimistic.
